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NO-FLY LIST-THE NINTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIES
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF 49 U.S.C. § 46110, A
DECISION THAT OPENS THE DOORS OF DISTRICT
COURTS TO NO-FLY LIST CHALLENGES:
IBRAHIM V. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
J. CADE HAMNER*

N IBRAHIM V. Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit held, in part, that an alien passenger's claim seeking removal of her name from the government's No-Fly List was within
the jurisdiction of the district court.' The court erred, however,
because 49 U.S.C. § 46110 gives the U.S. Courts of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review orders of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).9 The majority was misguided in its
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.S. Business Administration 2006, summa cum laude, University of Texas at
Dallas. The author would like to thank his wife for her continued love and
support.
1 538 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 The relevant subsections of 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2000) provide in pertinent
part:
(a) Filing and Venue.-Except for an order related to a foreign
air carrier subject to disapproval by the President under section
41307 or 41509(f) of this title, a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (or the
Under Secretary of Transportation for Security with respect to security duties and powers designated to be carried out by the Under
Secretary or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to aviation duties and powers designated to be
carried out by the Administrator) in whole or in part under this
part, part B, or subsection (1) or (s) of section 114 may apply for
review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in
the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the
person resides or has its principal place of business.
(c) Authority of Court.-When the petition is sent to the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Administrator, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part of the
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logic that the district court retains jurisdiction simply because
the names of individuals are not actually placed on the No-Fly
List by the TSA, but by order of an agency not covered under 49
U.S.C. § 46110.3 At the least, "Ibrahim's claims against the Terrorist Screening Center are 'inescapably intertwined' with an order of the [TSA] and are thus still subject to § 46110(a). 4
Rahinah Ibrahim, a foreign student at Stanford University, attempted to fly from San Francisco to her home country of Malaysia in January of 2005. 5 When a United Airlines employee
discovered her name on the federal government's No-Fly List,
she was refused boarding.6 The United Airlines employee contacted the San Francisco Police who subsequently detained
Ibrahim for several hours before releasing her and allowing her
to fly home the following day.7 Ibrahim, who has yet to return
to the United States, brought an action seeking removal of her
name from the government's No-Fly List in federal district court
for the Northern District of California against a number of parties involved in the incident, including the Department of
Homeland Security. 8 The district court dismissed Ibrahim's
claims against several defendants holding that 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110 (a) stripped it of the jurisdiction it would otherwise have
had pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Department of Homeland Security was established following the events of September 11, 2001, to protect the United
States against acts of terrorism.'0 Congress transferred the TSA
and the head of that Administration, the Under Secretary of
order and may order the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Administrator to conduct further proceedings.
3 See Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1255.
4 Id. at 1259 (Smith, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 1253 (majority opinion).
6 Id. Individuals who have been identified by the TSA as posing a risk to air
travel are placed on one of two lists. Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp.
2d 1119, 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2005). The first, the No-Fly List, is made up of individuals who are prohibited from flying. Id. The second, the Selectee List, consists of individuals who must undergo additional screening before boarding an
aircraft. Id. The two lists may be collectively referred to as the "No-Fly List" in
cases within this casenote.
7 Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1253.
8 Id. at 1253-54.
9 Id. at 1254. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (stating that "district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the ... laws ... of the
United States").
10 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2006); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§ 101, 116 Stat. 2135.
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Transportation for Security, from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security.1" Under the
statutes of 49 U.S.C. §§ 114 and 44903, the legislature tasked the
TSA with a number of duties, including the issuance of orders
with respect to securing commercial air travel. 12 Congress provided an outlet for challenges to orders issued by the TSA when
it drafted 49 U.S.C. § 46110.13 Section 46110 directs that "a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by [the
TSA] . . .may apply for review of the order by filing a petition
for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia or in . . . the circuit in which the person resides
... .,aThe majority for the Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]he
district court determined, based on undisputed facts," that the
No-Fly List is compiled by an agency called the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which is actually part of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, not the TSA. 15 Thus, according to the majority,
"[b]ecause putting Ibrahim's name on the No-Fly List was an
'order' of an agency not named in section 46110, the district
court retains jurisdiction ....""
Judge N. Randy Smith, in his dissent, disputed the majority's
claim that placing Ibrahim's name on the No-Fly List was an order of the TSC and not the TSA. 17 He asserted that "Congress
squarely delegated the responsibility for promulgating regulations and directives relating to the No-Fly List to the [TSA] in 49
U.S.C. §§ 114(h) (3) and 44903(j). ' 8 Reading these statutes, it
is easy to understand Judge Smith's argument. Section
14(h) (3), dealing with the management of security information,
requires that the TSA work "in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers." 9 The section further requires the TSA "to use information from government agencies"
to identify travelers who may pose a threat to national security,
20
and to "prevent [those] individuals from boarding an aircraft.
6 U.S.C. § 203(2) (2006).
See generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 114, 44903 (2000).
13 See id. §§ 46110(a), (c) (granting U.S. Courts of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to orders of the TSA).
14 Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1260 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110(a) (2000)).
1-Id. at 1254-55 (majority opinion).
16 Id. at 1255.
17 Id. at 1259 (Smith, J.,dissenting).
11
12

18 Id.

19 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3) (2000).
20 Id. §§ 114(h)(3)(A), (B).
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Under section 44903(j)(2)(E)(iii) "[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the [TSC], shall design and
'2
review, as necessary... the no fly and automatic selectee lists." '
These statutes show Congress's intent of delegating the authority of implementing the No-Fly List to the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security under which the TSA operates, not
22
the TSC.

The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has held that special review statutes should be interpreted broadly. 23 Under 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1486(a), a predecessor to 46110(a),24 the Ninth Circuit followed the interpretations of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and
D.C. Circuits in holding that "[s]ection 1486(a) is not to be
given a narrow, technical reading; instead, it is to be interpreted
expansively. '25 Further, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the premise of those courts that "the purpose of special review statutes-coherence and economy-are best served if courts of
appeal exercise their exclusive jurisdiction over final agency actions. '26 Like the district court in Ibrahim, the district court for
the Western District of Washington also followed this precedent
27 The plaintiffs
in Green v. TransportationSecurity Administration.
in Green claimed that they were innocent parties with no links to
terrorism, but simply had the same names as parties on the NoFly List.2" The court explained that "to the extent... Security
Directives establish a No-Fly List .

.

. this Court has no subject

matter jurisdiction. "29
Following the court's precedent, Judge Smith strengthened
his argument that the creation of the No-Fly List is an "order" of
the TSA ° In Gilmore v. Gonzales, the plaintiff alleged that the
government's airline passenger identification policy requiring
passengers to present identification before flying was unconsti21 Id. § 44903(j)(2)(E)(iii); Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1259-60 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
22 Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1259-60 (Smith, J., dissenting).
23 See, e.g., San Diego Air Sports Ctr., Inc. v. FAA, 887 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir.
1989); Sima Prods. Corp. v. McLucas, 612 F.2d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1980); see also 49
U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) (2000) (revising 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a)).
24 City of Los Angeles v. FAA, 239 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001).
25 San Diego Air Sports Ctr., Inc., 887 F.2d at 968.
26 Id. (quoting Sima Prods. Corp., 612 F.2d at 313).
27 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
28 Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1125.
30 See Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Smith, J.,
29

dissenting).
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tutional.3 ' The court ruled that a TSA Security Directive is a
final order under the meaning of § 46110(a) if it (1) "imposes
an obligation," (2) "provides a definitive statement of the
[TSA's] position," (3) "has a direct and immediate effect" on a
party, and (4) "envisions immediate compliance. ''3 2 The court
held that the security directive in question was an order of the
TSA because Gilmore had an obligation to present identification, the directive clearly detailed the TSA's position, there was
a direct and immediate effect on Gilmore for refusing to comply
with the policy, and the directive envisioned immediate compliance.3 3 Judge Smith explained that "[i]n light of the [applicable] statutory language" and the court's "decisions construing
the term 'order,"' Ibrahim's claims against the TSC "constitute a
challenge to an order of the [TSA]" and are thus subject to exclusive appellate review. 4
Judge Smith further attacked the majority's reasoning by explaining that Ibrahim's claims were also subject to § 46110 because her claims against the TSC were "inescapably intertwined
with an order of the [TSA]. 35 Two cases before the Ninth Circuit, Mace v. Skinner and Gilmore, established the idea that claims
against one agency can be "inescapably intertwined" with claims
subject to § 46110.36 In Mace, the court held that the district
court's dismissal of plaintiffs "broad constitutional challenge to
the FAA's power to revoke his mechanic's certificate" was in error.3 7 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that "the district court
erred by dismissing the claims because they were not 'inescapably intertwined' with an order that was subject to exclusive appellate review under the precursor statute to § 46110(a)." 38 In
Gilmore, the court held that "Gilmore's due process vagueness
challenge [was] 'inescapably intertwined' with a review of the
order because it squarely attack[ed] the orders issued by the
'39
TSA with respect to airport security.
31 435 F.3d 1125, 1129
32 Id. at 1132 (internal
33 See id. at 1133.
34 Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at
35 Id. at 1259.
36 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at

(9th Cir. 2006).
quotations omitted).
1260 (SmithJ., dissenting).

1133 n.9; Mace v. Skinner, 34 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir.
1994).
37 Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1260 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Mace, 34 F.3d at
858-60).
38 Id. (citing Mace, 34 F.3d at 858).
39 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1133 n.9; see also Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1260 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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The majority in Ibrahim seemed to collectively ignore its own
precedent by dismissing the notion that an order of one agency
may be "inescapably intertwined" with the statutory requirements of another agency. The government argued that though
the decision to put Ibrahim's name on the No-Fly List was not
made by the TSA, it was still subject to § 46110 because it was
"inescapably intertwined" with an order issued by the TSA.4 °
The majority disregarded its precedent in an almost patronizing
response to the government's argument, stating that while "the
statute provides jurisdiction to review an 'order'-it says nothing
about 'intertwining,' escapable or otherwise."'" Those remarks
would have been better placed in Mace, prior to the court's
adoption of such a standard.4 2 The court made no statement
that would give the impression that it was reversing its position
on orders being "inescapably intertwined."
Judge Smith argued in his dissent that the majority's attempts
to distinguish its precedent case of Gilmore, were merely "distinctions without difference."43 He noted that the majority argues
Gilmore "(1) involved a claim against the [TSA] instead of the
[TSC], as is the case here; and (2) did not decide whether the
No-Fly List constitutes an order."44 The Congressional directive
set forth in § 46110(a),Judge Smith argued, is what matters, not
whether Gilmore decided if the No-Fly list was an order of the
TSA.45 Judge Smith underscored the premise that "the [TSA] is
charged with developing-in consultation with the [TSC]-the
'necessary, [sic] guidelines, policies, and operating procedures
for ... the no fly and automatic selectee lists. '4 6 Judge Smith
was far more sound in his reasoning than the majority in recognizing that because of the holdings of the Ninth Circuit in Mace
and Gilmore, "district courts lack jurisdiction to consider claims
that are 'inescapably intertwined' with orders of the [TSA]
"47

It is difficult to decipher where the tipping point lies in the
eyes of the Ninth Circuit. If the district courts follow the reasoning in Gilmore, a plaintiff who claims he should not have to pre40

Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1255 (majority opinion).

41 Id.
42 See

Mace, 34 F.3d at 858.

43 Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1261 (Smith, J., dissenting).
4

Id.

45 Id.
46

Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C § 44903(j) (2) (E) (iii) (2000)).

47 Id.
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sent identification prior to boarding a commercial aircraft is
directly challenging an order of the TSA.4 8 However, if the district courts are presented with a scenario as in Ibrahim, where a
plaintiff did present identification and that identification was
subsequently compared to names on the government's No-Fly
List, the plaintiff need simply challenge the fact that his name is
on the No-Fly List to be within the district court's jurisdiction.4 9
This, the Ninth Circuit claims, is not a challenge of a TSA order.50 Yes, the TSA is required by statute to take measures to
secure commercial air travel against the threat of terrorism including establishing, maintaining, and updating the No-Fly
List.51 And yes, the TSA works in consultation with other federal
agencies to produce the No-Fly List as they are further required
by statute to do.5 2 But because another federal agency (the
TSC) maintains the database from which the No-Fly List is created, the Ninth Circuit feels that the congressional intent of
§ 46110, giving the federal appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to orders of the TSA, does not apply.5 3
Moreover, the majority fails to address here the precedent set in
Gilmore, that a challenge may be "inescapably intertwined" with
an order of the TSA if "it squarely attacks the orders issued by
the TSA with respect to airport security."5 4
Moving forward, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ibrahim will
have undesired effects on the implementation and use of the
No-Fly List, as well as judicial challenges of the list. There are
several roads that may develop as a result of the Ninth Circuit's
decision. First, and probably the foremost undesired effect will
be the increase of challenges to the No-Fly List within the district courts. Following this decision, anyone who resides or has
his principal place of business within the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit may challenge the placement of his name on the
government's No-Fly List by bringing a claim in U.S. District
Court. Second, the TSA will likely seek to more plainly assert
that names are placed on the No-Fly List as a result of an order
of its agency. It is safe to assume that the statutory requirement
that the TSA work in consultation with other agencies, including
48

49

See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006).
See Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1256.

50 Id.

-5 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(h) (3), 44903(j) (2) (E) (iii) (2000).
52 See id. § 114(h) (3).
53 See Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1256 n.8.
54 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1133 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006).
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the TSC, to develop and maintain the No-Fly List, was enacted
to promote the sharing of intelligence in addition to efficiency
within the federal government. If the TSA moves to establish a
separate No-Fly List within its agency in the hopes of avoiding
challenges at the district court level, these legislative intentions
will be lost. Finally, this decision invites further legislation to
clarify the congressional intent of § 46110. Perhaps only with
additional legislative clarity can mix-ups like those displayed in
the decisions of the Ninth Circuit be avoided.

